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1The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural
selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, two individuals interact several times and, in each
round, they have a choice between cooperation and defection. We
analyze the evolutionary dynamics of three simple strategies for the
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: always defect (ALLD), always coop-
erate (ALLC) and tit-for-tat (TFT). We study mutation-selection
dynamics in ﬁnite populations. Despite ALLD being the only strict
Nash equilibrium, we observe evolutionary oscillations among all
three strategies. The population cycles from ALLD to TFT to
ALLC and back to ALLD. Most surprisingly, the time average of
these oscillations can be entirely concentrated on TFT. In contrast
to the classical expectation, which is informed by deterministic
evolutionary game theory of inﬁnitely large populations, stochas-
tic evolution of ﬁnite populations need not choose the strict Nash
equilibrium and can therefore favor cooperation over defection.
In the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), two players have the choice to cooperate or to
defect. Both obtain payoﬀ R for mutual cooperation, but a lower payoﬀ P for
mutual defection. If one individual defects, while the other cooperates, then
the defector receives the highest payoﬀ T whereas the cooperator receives the
lowest payoﬀ S. We have T > R > P > S. Defection dominates cooperation:
in any mixed population, defectors have a higher ﬁtness than cooperators.
As is standard in repeated games, new strategies become possible when
the game is repeated, and these strategies can lead to a wider range of equi-
2librium outcomes (1-8). In particular, in the inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma, cooperation becomes an equilibrium outcome, but defection re-
mains an equilibrium as well (9, 10). To select between these equilibria, (11 -
13) looked at the replicator dynamic on a continuum population, and (14, 15)
applied variants of evolutionary stability to repeated games with complexity
costs. These solution concepts do not have explicit dynamics and are based
on models with a continuum population.
Our goal is to study explicit evolutionary dynamics in a large but ﬁnite
population. In order to explicitly model evolutionary dynamics, the space of
possible strategies must be restricted. In this paper, we explore the evolution-
ary dynamics of three strategies, ALLD, ALLC and TFT. TFT cooperates
in the ﬁrst move and then does whatever the opponent did in the previous
move. Ever since Axelrod’s celebrated computer tournaments (16), TFT is
a world-champion in the repeated PD, although it has some weaknesses and
has at times been defeated by other strategies (11, 12, 17). For our purpose
here, these weaknesses are not important. We conjecture that similar re-
sults hold for other reciprocal strategies, such as generous-tit-for-tat (11) or
win-stay, lose-shift (12, 18), which is also known as perfect-tit-for-tat (15).
We consider a ﬁnitely repeated game with an average number of rounds,
m. TFT is a conditional strategy, while the other two strategies are uncon-
ditional. Hence, it is natural to include a complexity cost for TFT (14): the
payoﬀ for TFT is reduced by a small constant, c. The payoﬀ matrix is given
3by

  

ALLC ALLD TFT
ALLC Rm Sm Rm
ALLD Tm Pm T + P(m − 1)
TFT Rm − c S + P(m − 1) − c Rm − c

  

(1)
The pairwise comparison of the three strategies leads to the following conclu-
sions. (i) ALLC is dominated by ALLD, which means it is best to play ALLD
against both ALLC and ALLD. (ii) TFT is dominated by ALLC. These two
strategies cooperate in every single round, but the complexity cost of TFT
implies that ALLC has a higher payoﬀ. (iii) If the average number of rounds
exceeds a minimum value, m > (T − P + c)/(R − P), then TFT and ALLD
are bistable. This means choosing between ALLD and TFT, each strategy
is a best response to itself.
Let us now consider traditional evolutionary game dynamics of all three
strategies as given by the replicator equation (19-21). This approach de-
scribes deterministic selection in inﬁnitely large populations. The frequency
of a strategy increases at a rate given by the diﬀerence between its ﬁtness
and the average ﬁtness of the population. The ﬁtness of a strategy is the ex-
pected payoﬀ from the game assuming many random encounters with other
individuals. In this framework, any mixed population of ALLC, TFT and
ALLD will converge to a pure ALLD population. The state where everybody
plays ALLD is the only stable equilibrium.
This outcome does not surprise us. From the payoﬀ matrix (1) we
see that ALLD is the only evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and the only
strict Nash equilibrium (22-24). If everybody uses ALLD, then every other
4strategy has a lower ﬁtness. Hence, no mutant strategy can invade an ALLD
population. In contrast, neither TFT nor ALLC nor any mixed population
have this property.
We can extend the replicator equation and consider selection and mu-
tation in a deterministic framework. In the resulting ‘replicator-mutator
equation’ (see Appendix), deterministic evolutionary dynamics remain es-
sentially the same for very small mutation rates: all trajectories starting
in the interior converge to a population that consists of almost only ALLD
players. We call this equilibrium ‘almost ALLD’. For small or zero mutation
rates, there is also an unstable mixed equilibrium containing all three strate-
gies. When there are no mutations, the proportion of ALLD players in this
equilibrium is c/[(m − 1)(P − S)] and thus can be made arbitrarily small
by increasing the number of rounds or by reducing the complexity cost. If
the mutation rate exceeds a critical value, a stable limit cycle forms around
this mixed equilibrium, so that there are two basins of attraction. Certain
initial conditions converge to ‘almost ALLD’, while others converge to the
limit cycle. For even larger mutation rates, ‘almost ALLD’ loses stability,
and the limit cycle becomes a global attractor. There is another critical mu-
tation rate, where the limit cycle disappears and all trajectories converge to a
stable mixed equilibrium containing all three strategies. Figure 1 illustrates
these deterministic dynamics.
Let us now move from deterministic evolution of inﬁnite populations
to stochastic evolution of ﬁnite populations (25-31). We study a frequency
dependent Moran process (30-32) with mutation. In each time period, an
individual is chosen for reproduction with a probability proportional to its
5ﬁtness. The oﬀspring replaces a randomly chosen individual. The total
population size is constant. With a small mutation probability, the oﬀspring
does not use the same strategy as the parent, but one of the two other
strategies. A precise description of the stochastic process is in the Appendix.
Reproduction can be interpreted genetically or culturally. In the latter case,
successful strategies spread by learning (or imitation) from one individual to
another.
The evolutionary dynamics of this stochastic process diﬀer from the
deterministic approach. In the limiting case of very small mutation rates,
the stochastic process does not converge to ALLD, but instead there are
endless oscillations from ALLC to ALLD to TFT and back to ALLC. For a
long time, the population is almost homogeneous for one strategy, but then a
mutant is produced which generates a lineage that takes over the population.
The transition rate from one homogeneous population to the next is given by
the product of the population size, N, times the mutation rate u, times the
ﬁxation probability of the mutant in the resident population. The oscillations
tend to revolve in one direction, because the transitions from ALLC to ALLD,
from ALLD to TFT, and from TFT to ALLC are much more likely than the
corresponding reverse transitions.
Surprisingly, the time average of these oscillations can be entirely dom-
inated by TFT. This means for most of the time the population is in a state
that consists of only TFT players. This observation is of interest, because
in the limit of very small mutation rates, an inﬁnite population chooses de-
fection, but a ﬁnite population (of the right size) chooses reciprocity. This
is a remarkable result given that the payoﬀ matrix (1) clearly indicates that
6ALLD is the only strict Nash solution and the only ESS. We observe that
neither concept implies evolutionary success in the stochastic setting of ﬁnite
populations.
The Appendix contains a theorem which states that the stochastic
process has a time average which is arbitrarily close to TFT. More precisely,
for a suitable range of population sizes, the population consists most of the
time of only TFT players, provided the average number of rounds m of the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma is large enough. Figure 2 shows the (stationary)
distribution of the stochastic process for numerical simulations.
The transition rate from an ALLD population to a TFT population is
Nuρ where ρ is the ﬁxation probability of a single TFT player in an ALLD
population. The transition rate from a TFT to an ALLC population is of
order u, because ALLC and TFT are nearly neutral given a small complexity
cost of TFT. The transition rate from an ALLC to an ALLD population is
of order Nu, because ALLD has a strong selective advantage. Therefore, the
most rapid transition is from ALLC to ALLD. If Nρ > 1 then the transition
from ALLD to TFT is faster than the transition from TFT to ALLC. In this
case, the population consists most often of TFT players.
A natural extension of our work would be to accommodate the possi-
bility that players make mistakes, so that there is a small probability that a
realized action is diﬀerent from the intended action (15). This seems to be
particularly relevant when the number of rounds is large. In a recent paper
(33), Brandt and Sigmund study the eﬀects of errors in a deterministic model
for the evolution of an inﬁnite population of ALLC, ALLD and TFT players.
Evolutionary game theory of the last two decades has largely focused
7on deterministic descriptions of inﬁnitely large populations. Most of our
intuitions about evolutionary dynamics come from this important tradition
(20, 21). In this paper, we have shown that the intrinsic stochasticity of ﬁnite
populations can lead to surprising outcomes. Instead of convergence to the
only strict Nash solution, ALLD, we observe oscillations from ALLD to TFT
to ALLC and back to ALLD with a time average that is concentrated on
TFT. Stochastic evolution in ﬁnite populations leads to a natural selection
of reciprocity.
Appendix
Deterministic replicator dynamics. Deterministic evolutionary game
dynamics are given by the replicator equation (19-21)
˙ xi = xi(fi − φ), i = 1,...,n.
Here xi denotes the frequency of strategy i. The payoﬀ matrix is A = [aij].
The ﬁtness of strategy i is fi =
P
j xjaij. The average ﬁtness of the popula-
tion is φ =
P
i xifi. Note that
P
i xi = 1.
Deterministic replicator dynamics with mutations. Frequency de-
pendent selection and mutation can be described by the replicator-mutator
equation
˙ xi =
n X
j=1
xjfjqji − xiφ, i = 1,...,n.
Here qij denotes the probability that strategy i generates an oﬀspring using
strategy j. In Figure 1, qij = u for i 6= j, and qii = 1 − 2u.
Stochastic dynamics in ﬁnite populations. Consider a population of
size N and let u ≥ 0 denote the mutation probability. Let A = (aij)3
i,j=1 be
8a positive payoﬀ matrix. We deﬁne a frequency dependent Moran process
X(t) = X(t;u,N,A),t = 0,1,2,..., on the state space
SN =

(x1,x2,x3) ∈ N
3
0 : x1 + x2 + x3 = N
	
.
Here xi denotes the number of players using strategy i. If the population is
in state (x1,x2,x3) with xi ≥ 1, then the ﬁtness of individuals using strategy
i is
f(i) = f(i,x1,x2,x3;N,A) =
P3
j=1 aijxj − aii
N − 1
> 0.
We subtract aii because the individual does not interact with itself. In
each time step we choose one individual for reproduction and one for death.
The probability that an individual with strategy i reproduces is given by
xif(i)/
P
j xjf(j). The probability that the oﬀspring of this individual will
use strategy i is 1 − 2u. With probability u the oﬀspring will use one of the
two other strategies. The oﬀspring is replacing a randomly chosen individ-
ual; an individual using strategy i is removed with probability xi/N. This
algorithm deﬁnes a Markov chain on SN. If u > 0, the stochastic process
has no absorbing states and the transition matrix is irreducible. Hence there
is a well deﬁned unique stationary distribution π = π(s;u,N,A), s ∈ SN,
determined by the left-hand eigenvector associated with the unique largest
eigenvalue 1.
Limit distribution for small mutations. Consider the homogeneous
states s1 = (N,0,0), s2 = (0,N,0), s3 = (0,0,N). Let ρij(N,A) be the
probability that the no-mutation process {X(t;0,N,A)} gets absorbed in sj
if initially every individual but one plays i and one plays j. To determine
the limit of the stationary distribution as the mutation rate goes to zero, we
9consider an associated Markov chain on the reduced state space {s1,s2,s3}
with transition matrix Λ(N,A) = (Λij(N,A))3
i,j=1, where
Λij(N,A) =
1
2
ρij(N,A), j 6= i, Λii(N,A) = 1 −
1
2
X
j6=i
ρij(N,A).
For every N and every positive payoﬀ matrix A, the matrix Λ(N,A) is posi-
tive. Therefore there is a unique positive vector
λ(N,A) = (λ1(N,A),λ2(N,A),λ3(N,A))
such that
λ(N,A)Λ(N,A) = λ(N,A), λ1(N,A) + λ2(N,A) + λ3(N,A) = 1.
It can be shown that
lim
u→0π(sj;u,N,A) = λj(N,A) for j = 1,2,3, (2)
and for every s ∈ SN \ {s1,s2,s3},
lim
u→0π(s;u,N,A) = 0.
Note that f(i,x1,x2,x3;N,A), ρij(N,A), Λ(N,A) and λ(N,A) depend con-
tinuously on A.
Returning to the prisoner’s dilemma game, ﬁx payoﬀs
T > R > P > S > 0.
Identify strategies 1:AllC, 2:AllD, 3:TFT. Let c ∈ [0,S) be the overall cost
of playing TFT. For every expected number of rounds m ≥ 1 let
A(m) =

  

R S R
T P 1
mT + P
 
1 − 1
m

R − c
m
1
mS + P
 
1 − 1
m

− c
m R − c
m

  

.
10The following theorem states that for a suitable range of population
sizes, the population consists most of the time of TFT players, provided the
average number of rounds is large enough.
Theorem. Given  > 0, there exists a population size N0 such that the
following holds. For every N1 > N0 there exists m0 ∈ N such that for every
m ≥ m0 there is u0(m) > 0 such that
π(s3;u,N,A(m)) ≥ 1− for every N ∈ {N0,...,N1} and 0 < u ≤ u0(m).
A proof of the theorem is given in (34). Here we provide only a sketch
of the proof. In the ﬁrst step, we consider the Moran process corresponding
to the prisoner’s dilemma game with inﬁnitely many rounds. The payoﬀ
matrix is given by
A = lim
m→∞A(m) =

  

R S R
T P P
R P R

  

.
We examine the asymptotic behavior of the ﬁxation probabilities ρij(N,A)
for the no-mutation process as N → ∞. In the second step, we turn to
the associated Markov chain on the reduced state space {s1,s2,s3}. We use
the results from the ﬁrst step to determine the behavior of the stationary
distribution λ(N,A) as N → ∞. It turns out that
lim
N→∞
λ3(N,A) = 1. (3)
Thus in the inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the associated Markov
chain spends nearly all the time at TFT when N is large. On the other
11hand, it can be shown that for any ﬁnite number of rounds,
lim
N→∞
λ3(N,A(m)) = 0. (4)
In the third step, we deduce that λ3(N,A(m)) is close to 1 provided that (i)
m and N are large enough, see (3), and (ii) N is not too large, see (4). To
return from the associated Markov chain to the original chain on the whole
state space SN, we ﬁnally use the limit relation (2).
We thank the referees for their detailed suggestions which helped to
improve the presentation of our results.
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14Figure Legends
Fig. 1. Deterministic replicator dynamics of an inﬁnite population with dif-
ferent mutation rates u. Full circles represent stable stationary points, empty
circles represent unstable stationary points. In panels b) and c), the symbol
× indicates the time average of the limit cycle. The payoﬀs in the prisoner’s
dilemma game are T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0.1, the expected number of
rounds is m = 10, and the complexity cost for TFT is c = 0.8.
Fig. 2. Frequencies of visits of the Moran process for diﬀerent population sizes
N and diﬀerent mutation rates u. Dark points correspond to states that are
often visited. Most points in the interior of the state space are rarely visited,
transitions from AllC to AllD and from AllD to TFT are faster than those
from TFT to AllC. The process spends most of the time at or near the state
where everyone plays TFT. For the smaller mutation rate, the concentration
of the stationary density to the vertices is more strongly pronounced. The
payoﬀs are T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0.1, the expected number of rounds
is m = 10, and the complexity cost for TFT is c = 0.8. The arrows indicate
the direction of the stochastic oscillations.
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